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HATE SPEECH LAWS, LEGITIMACY, AND
PRECAUTION: A REPLY TO
JAMES WEINSTEIN
Alexander Brown*
Ronald Dworkin once remarked to me that he thought
Robert Nozick was a highly skilled defender of the indefensible. I
have the impression from reading James Weinstein’s interesting
article that this is partly how he sees defenders of hate speech
bans.1 This is not how I see myself, of course; which is to say, I see
myself as neither especially skilful nor as defending the
indefensible. Indeed, given that, as I attempted to show in my
recent book,2 not only does virtually every person on the planet
live under at least some form of hate speech law but also such law
is marked by great internal variety, I rather suspect that what is
indefensible is either rejecting or defending hate speech law en
masse. I hope to bring this out in my contribution to this
symposium.3
There is much in Weinstein’s article to contemplate, but I
shall limit myself to making the following four main points. First,
I believe that debates concerning the normative standing of hate
speech law are always improved by heeding the internal variety of
* Reader in Political and Legal Theory, University of East Anglia (UEA), UK. I
am tremendously grateful to Professor Weinstein for inviting me to join this special edition
and for numerous constructive and candid exchanges during the course of writing my reply.
1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017).
2. ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
(2015).
3. I shall not, however, attempt a detailed analysis of the concept of hate speech,
nor comment on which groups ought to be protected by hate speech laws. For more on
these thorny issues, see Alexander Brown, What is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of Hate,
36 L. & PHIL. 419 (2017); Alexander Brown, What is Hate Speech? Part 2: Family
Resemblances, L. & PHIL. (online first, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10982017-9300-x); Alexander Brown, The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1:
Consistency, Practical, and Formal Approaches, 29 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 275 (2016); Alexander
Brown, The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 2: Functional and
Democratic Approaches, 30 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 23 (2017).
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such law, and although I can see something of that same care in
Weinstein’s article, such as when he distinguishes between
different forms of hate speech law based on relative detriment to
the legitimacy of so-called downstream laws, in some instances
this care is lacking. Second, Weinstein plays up the importance of
collective authorization or democratic legitimacy of downstream
laws vis-à-vis “(a) the obligation of those restrained by the speech
restriction to obey a downstream antidiscrimination law; and (b)
the morality of enforcing the downstream measure against those
whose participatory rights have been impaired by the upstream
speech restriction.”4 These may be important aspects of what it
means to detract from the legitimacy of downstream laws, but
they do not exhaust the relevant aspects. Third, I think that
Weinstein’s article ignores some important nuances in what I have
argued about hate speech laws and political legitimacy, and
ignores something that might be true of the relationship between
political and democratic legitimacy, namely, it might be that
political legitimacy takes lexical priority over and, therefore,
cannot be traded off against, the collective authorization or
democratic legitimacy of downstream laws. Finally, I believe that
in describing my use of the precautionary principle as “plainly
indefensible” Weinstein has done justice neither to the raw
plausibility of that principle nor to how I applied it to the special
silencing effects of hate speech.
I plan to make the aforementioned points in the course of
responding to two main objections that Weinstein levels against
the arguments I made concerning hate speech regulations and
political legitimacy in Chapter 7 of my book. The first objection
concerns my response to Dworkin’s argument that if we introduce
“upstream” hate speech regulations and thereby “intervene too
soon in the process through which collective opinion is formed,”
then “we spoil the only democratic justification we have for
insisting that everyone obey these [downstream] laws.”5 I argued
in response to Dworkin that there might also be a sense in which
hate speech bans are not a threat to but a requirement of political
legitimacy. I suggested that the question of the political legitimacy
of, say, the legal system, might turn on whether the legal system
could be the subject of interpersonal justification and consensus
4. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 535.
5. RONALD DWORKIN, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY v, viii
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009).
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among free and equal citizens. More precisely, I said “that
political legitimacy, including the legitimacy of the legal system,
itself depends upon its being possible, at least in principle, to
justify that system to each citizen bound by it on the basis of
fundamentals of justice that they cannot reasonably reject.”6 I also
proposed that
members of minority or vulnerable groups could reasonably
reject the following justification of an absolutist free speech
doctrine. “For fear that hate speech law may put at risk the
collective authorization . . . of downstream laws from which you
benefit, we shall neglect to utilize the measures at our disposal
to curb forms of hate speech that can be corrosive of a shared,
public sense of the basic elements of your reputation, status
and dignity as members of society in good standing.”7

I believe that this attempt to justify an aggressive free speech
regime to the victims of hate speech would fail because they would
rightly see it as violating fundamentals of justice. By
“fundamentals of justice” I mean, following Waldron’s definition,
“propositions establishing everyone’s right to justice and
elementary security, everyone’s claim to have their welfare
counted along with everyone else’s welfare in the determination
of social policy, and everyone’s legal status as a rights-bearing
member of society.”8 These are, I believe, basic propositions that
everyone can, and should, be willing to accept, and that, under
certain circumstances, will constitute grounds for reasonably
rejecting an aggressive free speech regime.
However, Weinstein objects that despite my having provided
a legitimacy-based argument for hate speech bans, I have
nevertheless failed to provide a like-for-like legitimacy-based
argument in response to Dworkin. In order for a legitimacy-based
argument to have traction against Dworkin’s contention that
upstream hate speech bans can spoil the legitimacy of
downstream laws then, such an argument must also work at the
level of the legitimacy of downstream laws, claims Weinstein. In
his words,
even on the assumption that failure to enact hate speech laws
does compromise legitimacy, it is, as Brown notes, the
6. BROWN, supra note 2, at 208.
7. Id.
8. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1596, 1626, n. 127 (2010).
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legitimacy of “the legal system” that has been diminished, not
the obligation to obey or the morality of an enforcement of a
particular law or laws. . . . It is difficult, however, to weigh a loss
to systemic legitimacy against a detriment to the legitimacy of
a particular law. The work done by these two types of
legitimacy is very different. The concern of systemic legitimacy
is, as Brown notes, identification with the legal system. In
contrast, the concern about the legitimacy of a particular law
that I have emphasized in this article is whether it is moral for
the state to use force to make dissenters comply with a law with
which they can reasonably disagree.9

Weinstein has missed some important nuances in what I said
about political legitimacy, however. For one thing, what I actually
said was that “political legitimacy, including the legitimacy of the
legal system,” itself depends on interpersonal justification and
consensus among free and equal citizens. I used the term
“including” in a non-exhaustive way, to mean at least this (but not
necessarily only this). Indeed, the illustrative example I gave
focused on the interpersonal justification of what I called “an
absolutist free speech doctrine,” which is only one feature of the
system of law, albeit an important one. It is an open question
whether a failure to justify this feature would constitute not just a
deficit in the legitimacy of this feature but also a deficit in the
legitimacy of the entire legal and political system. This would
depend on whether the legal and political system as a whole could
be the subject of interpersonal justification and consensus among
free and equal citizens, given attempts to justify the totality of its
constitutional laws, civil rights laws, public policies, and so on. At
any rate, I believe that the question of political legitimacy based
on interpersonal justification and consensus among free and equal
citizens can be meaningfully applied to particular features of the
legal and political system, including both upstream and
downstream laws, as well as to the entirety of that system.
This clarification is important for understanding what I
would say about the legitimacy of downstream laws such as those
involved in Waldron’s English landlord example. Waldron asks us
to image a landlord who discriminates against English families of
South Asian descent in a way that is prohibited by English
antidiscrimination laws. At the same time, English hate speech
laws, such as laws banning the stirring up of racial hatred, prevent
9.

Weinstein, supra note 1, at 577.
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the landlord from using threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behaviour with either the intention or likelihood of stirring up
hatred against Pakistanis defined as a racial, ethnic or national
group.10 Whereas Dworkin claims that upstream laws can spoil the
legitimacy of downstream antidiscrimination laws—laws that
protect the very people who are also protected by the upstream
laws—Waldron contends that “if we had a law that was
specifically tailored to prohibit only expression at the viciously
vituperative end of this spectrum, it might be an open question
whether it would have anything more than a minimal effect on
legitimacy.”11 Weinstein criticises Waldron for intimating that the
detriment to the legitimacy of the downstream law could prove to
be “minimal.”12 But he also criticises me for failing to provide a
like-for-like legitimacy-based argument in response to Dworkin.13
However, I believe that my account of political legitimacy does
have the wherewithal to say something about the political
legitimacy of downstream laws based on interpersonal
justification and consensus among free and equal citizens.
Specifically, I think that it is quite possible to justify an
antidiscrimination law even to those people who disagree with it
and who are denied certain specific types of opportunities (but not
all types of opportunities) to publicly argue against it. It might go
something along these lines. “You have an obligation to obey
antidiscrimination laws, and we have a moral right to enforce
antidiscrimination laws, for the simple reason that the state has a
duty to fight injustice and it is clearly unjust to discriminate
against people in their access to jobs, housing, transport, services,
and so forth, merely because of their possession of protected
characteristics, and, what is more, you have this obligation, and
we have this moral right, even if hate speech laws reduce to some
extent the collective authorization of these very same
antidiscrimination laws and therefore diminish the democratic
legitimacy of these laws, keeping in mind the fact that we are
10. Waldron, supra note 8, at 1643.
11. Id. at 1646.
12. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 532, and subpart A of Part III. Note, however, that
whilst Weinstein claims these hate speech laws are detrimental to legitimacy, he stops short
of saying that such laws would actually remove the landlord’s normative obligation to obey
the law and the state’s moral right to enforce the law against him. Ibid. So despite
Weinstein’s baulking at Waldron’s use of the word “minimal,” both he and Waldron are
in perfect agreement that whatever the nature of the detriment to the legitimacy of
downstream law, it is not ‘catastrophic.’ Waldron, supra note 8, at 1642.
13. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 575–78.
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utilising narrowly framed hate speech laws to curb forms of hate
speech that can be corrosive of a shared, public sense of the basic
elements of people’s equal status and dignity as members of
society in good standing, and corrosive of people’s sense of
physical security.” I believe that such an attempt to
interpersonally justify the antidiscrimination law would succeed
because it appeals to fundamentals of justice that nobody can
reasonably reject.
There is another, related nuance that Weinstein has missed.
In my book I presented the process of interpersonal justification
and consensus among free and equal people as a way of assessing
hate speech law from “the sole perspective of political
legitimacy.”14 I made it clear that “[t]his is not about trading off
political legitimacy with the assurance of civic dignity but about
the way in which the assurance of civic dignity is constitutive of
the realization of political legitimacy.”15 In a similar vein, pace
Weinstein’s interpretation, I am not attempting to “weigh a loss
to systemic legitimacy against a detriment to the legitimacy of a
particular law.” Rather, I am claiming that the upstream hate
speech law is politically legitimate only insofar as it could be the
subject of interpersonal justification and consensus among free
and equal people and, similarly, that the downstream
antidiscrimination law is politically legitimate only insofar as it
could also be the subject of interpersonal justification and
consensus among free and equal people. This holds true even if
the downstream law suffers diminished democratic legitimacy due
to the politically legitimate upstream law. So this is not about
weighing a loss to systemic legitimacy against a detriment to the
legitimacy of a particular law. Rather, it is about recognising the
appropriateness of iterative applications of the test of political
legitimacy for the legal system but also for upstream and
downstream laws, and, furthermore, about placing political
legitimacy and democratic legitimacy in what might be their
rightful order of priority.
Weinstein’s second objection focuses directly on my
argument that free and equal people could reasonably reject a
proposal for an aggressive free speech regime that disallows hate
speech bans, even if the justification for the proposal appealed to
14.
15.

BROWN, supra note 2, at 208.
Id.
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the protection of the democratic legitimacy of downstream laws.
According to Weinstein, this argument underestimates the
available evidence on the negative impact of hate speech laws on
the democratic legitimacy of downstream laws. He writes:
If this article has demonstrated anything, it is that hate speech
laws as they actually exist, and of the type that Brown thinks
justified, present much more than some “risk” to “collective
authorization and legitimacy of downstream laws” from which
members of these groups benefit. Nor, contrary to Brown’s
exposition of Waldron’s erroneous view, have they resulted in
only “relatively minor reduction in the collective authorization
of downstream laws.” Rather, as discussed in subsections B and
C of this Part [IV], their effect on legitimacy, both in the
normative and descriptive sense, is substantial. In light of such
significant detriment to political legitimacy, even if one accepts
hypothetical consent as the basis of political legitimacy, there
is a very real question whether Brown’s hypothetical
interlocutors could reasonably consider the failure of a
jurisdiction to enact broad hate speech prohibitions of the type
Brown defends as contrary to “the fundamentals of justice.”16

Now I am not entirely certain what Weinstein has in mind
when he says I defend “broad hate speech prohibitions.” But he
does give a clue in the footnote attached to the sentence “hate
speech laws as they actually exist, and of the type that Brown
thinks justified.” He writes:
Thus far beyond the ban on highly vituperative hate speech
that Waldron thinks might be justified, Brown defends bans on
group defamation (sensu stricto) and on incitement to racial
hatred, id. at 214. Despite the seemingly limited scope of such
laws, they have, as I have demonstrated, been used to impair,
and perhaps in some cases destroy, the legitimacy of
downstream antidiscrimination laws. See subparts A and B of
this Part [IV].17

Nevertheless, I find this to be a strange line of objection given that
subparts A and B of Part IV of Weinstein’s article in fact have
nothing to say about group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and
relatively little to say about incitement to hatred laws (aside from
one Dutch case heard by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) about which I shall say more in a moment). Instead, the
vast majority of what he says in these subparts concerns
16.
17.

Weinstein, supra note 1, at 576.
Id. at 576 n.174.
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expression-oriented hate crimes,18 specifically, public order
offences involving threatening or abusive words or behaviour,
that are aggravated by hostility toward people based on their
possession or perceived possession of certain protected
characteristics.19 In other words, despite what Weinstein suggests,
subparts A and B of his article have certainly not “demonstrated”
that group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to
hatred laws have been used to impair or even destroy the
legitimacy of downstream antidiscrimination laws.
To expand on this point, I take it that, for Weinstein, the most
problematic hate speech laws are those that leave little or no
leeway or room for people to express certain views in other
permissible ways. In subpart A (Part IV), he cites various
aggravated public order offences in England and Wales that he
believes have, as applied, effectively prevented people from
expressing in public their sincerely held religious view that
homosexuality is immoral even without using epithets or slurs or
stirring up hatred.20 Then, in subpart B (Part IV), Weinstein spells
out what he takes to be the “annihilation” of legitimacy of
downstream laws associated with such upstream laws. Here he
claims that people who have been prevented by such upstream
laws from expressing in public the view that homosexuality is
immoral no longer have a political obligation to obey downstream
antidiscrimination laws. What is more, he claims that such hate
speech laws might even, in worst case scenarios, “render
immoral” the enforcement of downstream laws against people
that have been silenced by them. However, these particular sorts
of hate speech laws, what I call expression-oriented hate crime
laws, are in fact much broader and more restrictive of speech than

18. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 35–38.
19. For some concrete examples of how such hate speech laws have been used in
England and Wales, see Brown, supra note 3, at 285–86, 288–89 n.172, 311 n.252.
20. Two offences are involved in many of Weinstein’s examples. The first is s. 4A of
the Public Order Act 1986 (“Intentional harassment, alarm or distress”), which makes it
an offence for someone to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or to
display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or
insulting, with intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress and thereby causing
harassment, alarm or distress. The second is s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended
by s. 57 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013) (“Harassment, alarm or distress”), which makes
it an offence for someone to use threatening or abusive (as amended) words or behaviour
or to display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or
abusive within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or
distress thereby.
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the group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to hatred
laws that I defended in Chapter 7 of my book. So even if these
expression-oriented hate crime laws have, in their application by
the police, prosecutors and courts in England and Wales,
effectively prevented people from even temperately expressing in
public their view that homosexuality is immoral, the same is not
necessarily true of incitement to hatred laws in England and
Wales. Indeed, I would argue that these other, more narrowly
framed hate speech laws do allow space for people to express
certain views in other permissible ways.21
Thus, consider Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 (as
amended by s. 74 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act in
2008), which inter alia sets out various offences relating to the
stirring up of hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. It is
narrowly framed in at least two important ways. First, it is written
in such a way as to ensure that hate speakers have other
permissible ways of stirring up hatred. This is because the law
makes clear that the offences are only committed if people
intentionally use “threatening” words or behaviour or written
material or public performance of play or recording in order to
stir up hatred. Non-threatening modes of expression, as well as
unintentional stirring up, are untouched by these particular
offences. Second, s. 29JA of Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986
(as amended by Schedule 7 of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples)
Act 2013) directly and explicitly states that people cannot be
treated as stirring up hatred merely because they engage in
discussion or criticism of homosexual conduct or gay marriage, for
instance. This also gives speakers, including speakers motivated
by sincerely held religious beliefs, some significant leeway to
express their views on homosexuality and gay marriage without
prosecution. I would add here that other countries also have
similar caveats written into their incitement to hatred laws.22
21. I note that Waldron makes a similar point in his contribution to this symposium.
See Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James Weinstein, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 697, 700–04 (2017).
22. In Canada, for example, the part of the criminal code that bans wilful promotion
of hatred also contains exemptions or permissible defences against prosecution “if, in good
faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an argument an opinion on a
religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a religious text.” See s. 319(3)(b) of the
Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda)
of 2004). Likewise, some states in Australia have on the books legislation banning
incitement to hatred which sets out exemptions for speech that has a religious purpose or
is motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs. See ss. 11(b)(i) and 11(2) of the Racial and
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Now, at this stage, Weinstein might point to how incitement
to hatred laws have been used by the courts in some cases to limit
or reduce the range of options for expression among hate
speakers, and that this alone is a significant detriment to the
democratic legitimacy of downstream laws, even if they have not
been banned from expressing certain views as such. For example,
in subpart A (Part IV) Weinstein does cite one example of an
application of incitement to hatred law. In Glimmerveen and
Hagenbeek v. Netherlands (1979)23 the ECtHR judged as
inadmissible applications made by two Dutch nationals who had
been found guilty by domestic courts of possessing, with intent to
distribute, leaflets that incited racial discrimination. So if what
Johann Glimmerveen really wanted to do, as an exercise of his
right to contribute to public discourse, was to express his views in
such a way that constitutes incitement to racial discrimination,
then he was not able to do so. In that sense his range of options
were limited or reduced. Or consider the English case R. v. Ali,
Javed, and Ahmed (2012),24 which is not discussed by Weinstein.
In July 2010, three devout but also socially conservative members
of the Muslim faith distributed leaflets on the streets of Derby
titled “Turn or Burn,” “GAY – God Abhors You,” “Death
Penalty?,” as a protest to the Gay Pride Festival taking place that
day. They became the first people to be successfully prosecuted
for offences relating to stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual
orientation in England and Wales. In his sentencing remarks
Judge Burgess made reference to the aforementioned clause
29JA, but nevertheless supported the jury’s decision that in this
particular case the wording of the leaflets did amount to the use
of threatening words or behavior with the intention of stirring up
hatred, based on the fact that four homosexual men had read the
leaflet and “[a]ll felt threatened.”25 In that sense the intervention
by the police and courts did limit or reduce these religionists’
range of options in how they could permissibly express their view
that homosexuality is a sin punishable in ways indicated in their
religious texts. Maybe what Weinstein would say about this case
is exactly what he says about some of the cases he presents in
Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vict.) and see ss. 80G(1)(b)(i) and 80G(1)(b)(i) (as
amended by s. 6 of Law No. 80 of 2004) (W. Austl.).
23. App. No. 8348/78 & 8406/78, 18 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 187 (1979).
24. No. T20110109 (Derby Cr. Ct.) (involving offences of stirring up hatred on
grounds of sexual orientation).
25. Transcript obtained directly from Judge Burgess.
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subpart A, Part IV, namely, that these speech restrictions
“effectively prevented these citizens from participating in the
public discussion of a host of antidiscrimination measures, as well
as of proposals to extend marriage to include same-sex couples, in
an intellectually honest and authentic manner.”26
However, I believe that even if incitement to hatred laws
do prevent some people from participating in public discourse in
an intellectually honest and authentic manner, that is, in a manner
of their choosing or in ways that perfectly express who they are as
people and what they believe in, and even if this prevention
thereby has a detrimental impact on the collective authorization
and democratic legitimacy of downstream laws, free and equal
people would nevertheless still have grounds to reasonably reject
a failure to enact and apply such laws, which is a matter of political
legitimacy. Whether the rejection is reasonable depends not
simply on what they are rejecting but also on the grounds of, or
reasons for, that rejection. To understand why free and equal
people could reject even a free speech regime that aggressively
protects the democratic legitimacy of downstream laws, it is
necessary to comprehend the gravity of the relevant grounds or
reasons. It seems to me that free and equal people might
reasonably look upon the adequate protection of their equal civic
dignity, such as via group defamation laws (sensu stricto), as a
precondition of any notional agreement to joining the political
community. This precondition is no less than what free and equal
people would stipulate as the sort of basic status or standing they
must retain in order for them to be willing to join together to form
a political community with everything this joining together also
entails about submitting to governmental institutions and a
system of law that assumes an obligation to obey the laws because
they are the laws and that claims a moral right to enforce the laws.
Perhaps there are other fundamentals of justice, such as
safeguarding people’s sense of their physical security, that is,
freedom from legitimate fear of acts of discrimination or violence,
that are also preconditions for any notional agreement to joining
the political community, and that would also require laws,
including incitement to hatred laws, that combat hate speech that
contributes to a climate of fear.27

26.
27.

Weinstein, supra note 1, at 562.
BROWN, supra note 2, at 66–75.
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Now suppose for the sake of argument that I am correct to
say that a regime of free speech that disallowed group defamation
laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to hatred laws could be
reasonably rejected on the grounds that it permitted the sorts of
hate speech that can jeopardise people’s sense of their equal civic
dignity and even their sense of physical security. What does this
mean for the political legitimacy of a political community that
routinely strikes down such hate speech laws? In brute terms, it
means that the community is less politically legitimate than it
could be. But what implications follow from this vis-à-vis
characteristic aspects of political legitimacy? Following
Weinstein’s lead, we might consider (a) a lesser normative
obligation to obey certain laws and (b) a lesser moral right of the
state to enforce certain laws. These do not, however, exhaust the
possibilities. Take also (c) people having grounds on which to
regret the loss of legitimacy and to strongly condemn the
government concerned, (d) a right to engage in acts of civil
disobedience short of disobeying justifiable laws, (e) a lesser
obligation to support the system of law as a whole, once again
short of breaking justifiable laws (for example, tax avoidance or
arranging one’s financial affairs to minimise tax liability within the
law), and even (f) a lesser obligation to refrain from taking the
law into one’s own hands in the sense of enforcing hate speech
norms that ought to be enshrined in law but are not (for example,
making threats of extrajudicial punishment against hate
speakers). Unfortunately, I do not have up my sleeve a theory that
can easily tell us which of these implications are most fitting for
political communities that unjustifiably fail to enact and apply
incitement to hatred laws, for example. But I do want to make the
point that no adequate discussion could begin and end with an
assessment of (a) and (b) alone.
I now turn to Weinstein’s second main objection. This
objection concerns the fact that in my book I also invoked the
precautionary principle in order to justify, or supply further
justification for, certain forms of hate speech law. Specifically, I
argued that
an authority may adopt laws forbidding hate speech when it
amounts to discriminatory harassment in the workplace or on
campus, or laws interdicting hate speech when it constitutes
discriminatory intimidation, because having identified the
possibility of the catastrophic antidemocratic outcome that a
proportion of the individuals targeted by hate speech will not
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participate in the formation of public opinion, and bearing in
mind the conditions of uncertainty that surround these
outcomes, it errs on the side of precaution.28

I was certainly not the first scholar to appeal to the
precautionary principle as a justification for the regulation of hate
speech. In her 2008 article, “A Constitutional ‘Right’ to Deny and
Promote Genocide?,” for example, Karen Eltis appealed to the
principle as a way of both reinterpreting and defending the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v. Keegstra.29 This case
involved a prosecution of an openly anti-Semitic school teacher
for the crime of wilful promotion of hatred under s. 319(2) (ex s.
281.2(2)) of the Criminal Code.30 According to Eltis, “the majority
opined that hate speech can serve as a precursor to genocide and,
through its ruling, advocated a precautionary approach to denial
and incitement.”31 A similar precautionary justification also seems
to have played a part in the thinking of the Kenya National
Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) in the course of its
work monitoring the 2005 Constitutional Referendum and 2007
General Elections and in pushing through new incitement to
hatred laws in Kenya.32 It is also implicit in Mari Matsuda’s most
recent article on hate speech.33 Genocide is not the only applicable
harm. For instance, Richard Posner has argued that incitement to
racial and religious hatred might constitute a long term threat to
national security of sufficient magnitude to warrant legal
sanctions even in the U.S.—on the evidence that heightened
levels of incitement to hatred against American Muslims increases
the risk over the long term of terrorist attacks by American
Muslims on home soil—even if we do not know exactly how long
it would take for the risk of a terrorist attack to significantly ramp
up.34 Whilst Posner does not endorse the precautionary principle,

28. Id. at 199.
29. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
30. Karen Eltis, A Constitutional “Right” to Deny and Promote Genocide? Preempting the Usurpation of Human Rights Discourse Towards Incitement from a Canadian
Perspective, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 463 (2008).
31. Id. at 476.
32. See Lawrence Murugu Mute, Legislation, Hate Speech, and Freedom of
Expression in Kenya, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Oct. 22, 2008), www.pambazuka.org/govern
ance/legislation-hate-speech-and-freedom-expression-kenya.
33. Mari J. Matsuda, Is Peacemaking Unpatriotic?: The Function of Homophobia in
the Discursive World, 11 J. HATE STUD. 9, 9–10 (2013).
34. RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 124 (2006).
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what he is suggesting is a sort of cost-benefit analysis that builds
in a margin of safety when it comes to risks of temporally distant
but especially serious harms.35
The sorts of harms that Eltis, the KNCHR, and Posner have
in mind (genocide, terrorist atrocities) are grave and irreversible.
They are equivalent to the devastating climate change harms that
are associated with the precautionary principle in the field of
environmental regulation. Of course, the sorts of harms that I
focused on in Chapter 7 of my book are not of the same magnitude
of gravity as these. Nevertheless, they are potentially more
probable harms and more proximate harms, causally speaking.
While they are not strictly irreversible (as with loss of life), they
are not easily reversible. And whilst less grave, they are still
extremely serious. I am speaking of the antidemocratic outcome
that a proportion of the individuals targeted by hate speech will
not contribute to public discourse nor participate in the formation
of public opinion, or will do so but with speech the content of
which has been warped, or will do so but without the ability or
power to achieve intended illocutionary or perlocutionary
effects.36 (Of course, the precautionary principle might also be
applied to other types of hate speech law that address other
categories of extremely serious harm other than the
aforementioned antidemocratic outcome.37) According to
Weinstein, however, my “invocation of the precautionary
principle in lieu of evidence . . . turns a problematic though
plausible argument into a plainly indefensible one.”38

35. Id. at 122. See also RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE
(2004).
36. For an overview of the literature, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 84–86, 198.
37. For example, the principle could potentially be invoked to justify laws disallowing
the use of epithets or insults directed at or targeted against individuals based on their
possession or perceived possession of protected characteristics, such as if such speech had
the potential to cause in a proportion of those subject to it serious psychological damage,
such as anxiety or distress, or to exacerbate the symptoms of pre-existing mental illnesses,
such as depression, or to trigger the onset of mental illnesses to which individuals may have
already been at risk, such as antisocial personality disorder, even if there was a lack of
decisive or consensus-based evidence to prove these effects. Id. at 49–58. Or, to take
another example, the principle might be invoked to justify laws banning incitement to
hatred if such speech had the potential to significantly contribute to the production and
maintenance of a climate of hatred which is partly constituted by an increased chance of
acts of discrimination, violence, damage to property, and so forth, even if there was a lack
of decisive or consensus-based evidence to prove this contribution. Id. at 66–75.
38. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580.
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According to the strong version of the precautionary
principle I had in mind, the main burden of proof is placed not on
those wishing to regulate or support the regulation of potentially
harmful activities but on those who wish to engage in or support
those activities. It is they who should demonstrate that the
activities would not produce significant harms if left unregulated,
based on evidence that is sufficiently rigorous, comprehensive and
abundant to command a consensus among the relevant body of
experts. The upshot is that the principle may require regulation of
activities because there is lack of consensus-based evidence that
the activities would not produce significant harms if left
unregulated. It goes without saying, however, that there must be
at least some minimally adequate evidence that the relevant
activities have certain effects and that these effects are potentially
harmful in order to shift the burden in this way. I believe that this
threshold has been met for hate speech and various types of
silencing effect.39 But it is not necessary for the evidence of harm
itself to be consensus-based.
At any rate, the crux of Weinstein’s objection to my
invocation of the precautionary principle is his assertion that
there is a worrying asymmetry between the regulation of hate
speech that has certain or known harmful effects, measured in
terms of some speakers’ reduced opportunities to contribute to
public discourse and participate in the formation of public
opinion, and the justification of such regulation in the name of
preventing only possible or potential harmful effects, measured in
the same way (only focusing on the subjects of hate speech). He
writes:
The view that bigots can be forbidden by force of law from
expressing their views—which will, if the law has any effect at
all, undoubtedly have a “silencing effect” on them—to avoid
the possibility that some unspecified “proportion of the
39. In other words, I do not accept the premise (present in some objections to hate
speech laws) that there is a paucity of evidence (i.e., not a minimally adequate level of
evidence) of harmful silencing effects. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 98–99. For evidence of
silence (or passivity) as a common response to, and effect of, hate speech, see, e.g., Laura
Leets, Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-Semitism and Antigay
Speech, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 341 (2002), and Katharine Gelber & Luke J. McNamara,
Evidencing the Harms of Hate Speech, 22 (3) SOC. IDENTITIES 324 (2016). For an analysis
of what silencing means in terms of harmfully removing real opportunities to participate
in the formation of public opinion, see, e.g., BROWN, supra note 2, at 194–208. I would like
to thank the journal’s editor, Jill Hasday, for suggesting I make these important
clarifications, which I had not made in the original version of my contribution.
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individuals targeted by the hate speech” might be deterred
from speaking is simply impossible to square with the basic
premise underlying participatory democracy that all citizens
should have the equal opportunity to engage in the formation
of public opinion regardless of the viewpoint they want to
express.40

Of course, the known harmful effects of hate speech
regulations are not limited to reducing the speakers’ opportunities
to contribute to public discourse and participate in the formation
of democratic public opinion.41 But, to focus on the democratic
harms, I believe that in addition to the asymmetry between
certain and potential effects, there is another asymmetry that
Weinstein either ignores or underestimates, and that makes the
invocation of the precautionary principle more not less justified.
The asymmetry I have in mind is in the nature of the silencing
effect at issue. When the state intervenes to criminalise certain
forms of hate speech, narrowly framed laws will curtail only that
given form of speech. Such laws, sensibly and properly applied,
will not stop the speaker from expressing him or herself in other
permissible ways. As mentioned above, if laws prohibit the use of
threatening words or behaviour to stir up hatred, then hate
speakers can perform the same speech acts in other ways, using
other kinds of words or behaviour. So, for example, a hate speaker
might be banned from saying this. “You think you can trust
Muslims, think again, they are vile, backward, and dangerous
people who deserve only our hatred, and when this country is
finally united in its hatred of Muslims, they had better watch out!”
But he might not be banned from saying this. “You think you can
trust Muslims, think again, they are vile, backward, and dangerous
people who deserve only our hatred.” By contrast, in the event
that hate speech has a silencing effect on those who are its
subjects, the effect is just that, silence; it can cause people not to
speak in any way. Of course, Robert Post is very convincing when
40. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580.
41. Other harmful effects include a reduction of negative freedom to engage in hate
speech and thereby to pursue self-development (for example, truth discovery, selfrealisation). See BROWN, supra note 2, at ch. 4. Then there is the loss of formal autonomy.
Hate speech regulations substitute a governmental choice for a personal choice about how
and when to embody one’s values in speech, including a personal choice as to what is
appropriate and what is inappropriate public speech. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Hate
Speech, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION
AND RESPONSES 57, 63–64 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012). For further
discussion, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 210–13.
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he states that part of the point of the First Amendment is to
protect citizens’ right to choose the ways, manner, and
circumstances of their participation in the formation of public
opinion.42 But surely another, perhaps even more fundamental
purpose of a regime of free speech is to ensure that all citizens
enjoy at least sufficient real opportunities to participate in public
discourse.43
It seems to me that part of the raw intuitive appeal of the
precautionary principle stems from the idea that we ought to be
better safe than sorry. When it comes to hate speech harms it is
also important to attend closely to who the “we” are, and what
harm they face. It is precisely because the nature of the harm
(silencing) is different for hate speakers and those people who are
the unwilling subjects of hate speech that it is not impossible to
square the precautionary approach with the principle that all
citizens should have sufficient real opportunities to engage in the
formation of public opinion. Perhaps Weinstein thinks that any
application of a strong version of the precautionary principle is
plainly indefensible. If so, then the grounds for his objection takes
him well beyond the hate speech debate and, more importantly,
his objection requires significant bolstering, well beyond his brief
remarks in the article.44
Building on his two main objections, Weinstein ends with an
offer to rescue my arguments. He writes: “I will build on some of
Brown’s better arguments to try to identify a countervailing
legitimacy concern sufficiently similar in type and character to the
42. See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 167
(Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); Robert Post, Democracy and Equality,
1 L., CULTURE & HUMAN. 142, 148 (2005).
43. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 194–201.
44. For general criticisms of the precautionary principle in various spheres of law and
regulation, see CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005); Stephen G. Wood et al., Whither the Precautionary Principle? An
American Assessment from an Administrative Law Perspective, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 581
(2006); and STEVE FULLER & VERONIKA LIPINSKA, THE PROACTIONARY IMPERATIVE:
A FOUNDATION FOR TRANSHUMANISM (2014). For a defence, see Timothy O’Riordan &
Andrew Jordan, The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental Politics, 4
ENV’T. VALUES 191 (1995); Marko Ahteensuu, Defending the Precautionary Principle
Against Three Criticisms, 11 TRAMES 366 (2007); David A. Dana, The Contextual
Rationality of the Precautionary Principle, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 67 (2009); and Nassim Nicholas
Taleb et al., The Precautionary Principle (With Application to the Genetic Modification of
Organisms) (NYU Sch. of Engineering Working Paper Series, Sep. 4, 2014),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.5787.pdf.
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legitimacy that I have argued is diminished or destroyed with
respect to downstream legislation, and which, therefore could, at
least theoretically, offset this deficit.”45 He then proffers the
following interesting case.
Suppose, for instance, that in a certain democratic country the
legislature is considering whether to grant an exemption from
its drug laws to members of an indigenous population to use a
substance traditionally employed by this group in religious
ceremonies. Suppose that it is also the case that hate speech
against this group, long subject to discrimination by the
European settlors and their descendants, is so rampant and
virulent that many members of this vulnerable minority group
are “out of fear for their personal safety or livelihood”
reasonably deterred by the hate speech from publicly
supporting the exemption. If the exemption is not passed, then
members of this indigenous community might well feel, and
aptly so, that they have no political obligation to obey a law
against ingesting the drug as part of their religious ceremony.46

However, Weinstein does not go on to actually defend what I
attempted to defend, namely, banning the hate speech in
question. He claims that “[i]t must be further demonstrated that
the gain in legitimacy produced by the hate speech ban at least
marginally exceeds the detriment to legitimacy caused by the
speech restriction.”47
I believe that Weinstein misunderstands what is really at
stake here. For one thing, his talk of gains in democratic
legitimacy produced by the hate speech ban offsetting the
detriment to democratic legitimacy caused by the speech
restriction is anathema to what I see as the basic proposition
underlying participatory democracy and democratic legitimacy.
The real touchstone is ensuring that all citizens enjoy at least
sufficient real opportunities to contribute to public discourse and
participate in the formation of public opinion. I also think that it
makes perfect sense to ask whether or not this basic proposition
or touchstone can itself claim political legitimacy, based on the
test of interpersonal justification and consensus among free and
equal citizens. The question is: would free and equal people have
reasons based on the fundamentals of justice to reject an
aggressive free speech regime that treated hate speech as a
45.
46.
47.

Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580.
Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 581.
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protected category even though certain forms of hate speech carry
a risk of effectively removing from some people who are the
subject of hate speech real opportunities to contribute to public
discourse and participate in the formation of public opinion?
Moreover, I believe that by refocusing the debate about hate
speech law onto the question of obligations to obey downstream
laws, Weinstein has overlooked a far more important question.
Why should people who are subject to hate speech and
interpersonal silencing be put in a position of having to think
about whether they have no political obligation to obey
downstream laws, much less of having to contemplate disobeying
these laws as a means of addressing the diminished democratic
legitimacy of those laws? To fall into this way of thinking about
their predicament risks imposing three harms on the victims of
hate speech: first, the harm of being subject to silencing hate
speech, as in, hate speech that, due to its psychological as well as
material effects, freezes them out of contributing to public
discourse and participating in the formation of public opinion;
second, having a decision about downstream laws go against them
partly because they did not contribute to public discourse and
participate in the formation of public opinion; and third, the harm
of having to engage in potentially risky forms of civil disobedience
simply to make their point. Adopting the aforementioned ideal of
political legitimacy as well as the precautionary principle as
justifications for effective and narrowly drawn hate speech
regulations means that victims of hate speech may be spared this
triply unenviable position.

